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Abstract 
This essay challenges the influential view that Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt played a central role in 
inaugurating an ‘anti-utopian age’. While the two thinkers certainly did their share to discredit the 
radical utopian inclination to portray a political blueprint in the abstract, I show that neither was 
straightforwardly anti-utopian. On the contrary, both thinkers’ writings display a different kind of 
utopian thinking, consisting in an imaginative and idealized reconstruction of existing polities. 
Schematically put, Berlin’s utopia was England reconstructed as a quintessential liberal society, 
whereas Arendt’s utopia was America reconstructed as a quintessential modern free republic. Those 
two polities differ from each other in important respects, but they share two essential features in 
common: they are claimed to be exempt from the rise of totalitarianism; and they allegedly give men 
and women the decent chance to live a fulfilling life. To illustrate Berlin’s and Arendt’s overlapping 
and yet differing visions, I consider their contrasting responses to the upheaval of 1968 – a possible 
utopian moment in the late 20th century. While their responses could scarcely be more different, they 
were informed by their shared desire to imagine an ideal polity in what both regarded as the darkest 




This essay considers how Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt portrayed an ideal polity in the mid- and 
late 20th century, when anti-utopianism supposedly characterised much of Western political thought. It 
focuses on two imaginatively reconstructed polities to tease out a specifically utopian aspect of their 
respective work: Berlin’s England and Arendt’s United States of America.1 Of course, ‘England’ and 
‘America’ designate physical spaces on a map, but they meant more to the two thinkers. For example, 
when Berlin proudly conceded his ‘pro-British bias’ and referred to toleration and liberty as ‘deeply 
and uniquely English’ values, he mentioned Britain and England as an exemplar of a certain set of 
desirable characteristics.2 Similarly, when Arendt referred to the ‘very structure of the [American] 
body politic’ as embodying ‘the revolutionary notions of public happiness and political freedom’, she 
not only offered an analysis of American history, politics and society but also discussed aspects of 
America to illustrate her normative ideals.3 But neither Berlin nor Arendt was concerned solely with 
the peculiarities of a specific country. England was dear to Berlin partly because it approximated to 
what he thought a human society could ideally be; the same held true for Arendt’s America. The 
important point is that the purported universals the two thinkers endorsed significantly, and sometimes 
irreconcilably, differed from each other. 
The aim of this essay is to challenge the influential view that Berlin and Arendt, alongside 
Norman Cohn, Jacob Talmon and Karl Popper, inaugurated an ‘anti-utopian age’. Russell Jacoby 
skilfully articulated this view in his popular 2005 book Picture Imperfect; subsequent scholars in 
various fields have uncritically accepted and reiterated Jacoby’s analysis.4 Thanks to the mid-20th-
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century anti-utopians’ wholesale and all-too-powerful attack on utopianism, Jacoby and others argue, 
we have come to associate utopia with violence, dictatorship and, ultimately, totalitarianism. Today, 
they continue, those working towards ‘peace, ease, and plenty [...] linked to universal brotherhood and 
communal work’ are typically dismissed as ‘foolhardy dreamers at best and murderous totalitarians at 
worst’, and what is left of utopianism is John Rawls’s exceedingly realistic utopia, which ‘merely 
validates’ the status quo.5 My objection to this analysis is twofold. First, neither Berlin nor Arendt was 
straightforwardly anti-utopian. True, both thinkers did their share to discredit the radical utopian 
inclination to portray a political blueprint in the abstract, attacking Plato’s Republic as the first of a long 
line of mistakes in the Western intellectual tradition. But their writings commonly display a different 
kind of utopian thinking, irreducible to either the Platonic/radical variant or the Rawlsian/realistic 
counterpart. 
Second, Jacoby and others ignore important differences among the mid-20th-century political 
thinkers in general and between Berlin and Arendt in particular. It is notable in this context that the 
critics have ignored the two thinkers’ mutual dislike.6 This, as I argued elsewhere,7 should not be 
reduced to (imagined) psychological issues such as Berlin’s alleged sexism and academic vanity; nor 
should it be attributed solely to the two thinkers’ disagreement over Israeli politics and the Zionist 
movement.8 Rather, it was underpinned by a set of significant theoretical differences. Building on a 
small group of studies attempting to do justice to this aspect of the two thinkers’ story,9 this essay 
comparatively examines Berlin’s and Arendt’s differing utopian visions to challenge Jacoby and his 
followers’ oversimplification. My guiding principle is this: while a political thinker’s task partly and 
importantly consists in considering various interpretations of individual key concepts such as freedom 
 3 
and equality, it must also involve some consideration as to how those concepts might be combined, 
adjudicated and sometimes compromised to be realised. Berlin and Arendt wished to see different sets 
of ideals realised, and they imaginatively portrayed, especially in their later work, actually existing 
polities from correspondingly differing angles.  
This essay proceeds in three sections. The first couple delineates Berlin’s and Arendt’s shared 
mode of utopian thinking, while drawing due attention to their competing ideals. Schematically put, 
Berlin’s utopia was England reconstructed as a quintessential liberal society, and Arendt’s utopia was 
America reconstructed as a quintessential modern free republic. True, at no point in time did Berlin’s 
‘England’ coincide with its real-world counterpart, nor Arendt’s ‘America’ with its real-world 
counterpart; but the two thinkers’ apparent shortfalls, I shall suggest, should be seen as stemming not 
so much from a lack of perceptiveness as from their parallel critical engagement with various forms of 
utopianism. Despite their significant differences, Berlin’s liberal England and Arendt’s free American 
republic share two essential features in common: they are claimed to be exempt from the rise of 
totalitarianism; and they allegedly give men and women the decent chance to live a fulfilling life. To 
elaborate on my comparative analysis, the third section of the essay will consider Berlin’s and 
Arendt’s contrasting responses to the upheaval of 1968. Their responses to this possible utopian 
moment could scarcely be more different, but they were informed by their shared desire to imagine an 






Berlin considers England to be a quintessential liberal society.10 This is testified to by many of his 
remarks, but the following from his autobiographical essay are particularly articulate and merit full 
citation: 
 
I confess to a pro-British bias. I was educated in England and have lived there since 1921; all 
that I have been and done and thought is indelibly English. I cannot judge English values 
impartially, for they are part of me: I count this as the greatest of intellectual and political good 
fortune. These values are the basis of what I believe: that decent respect for others and the 
toleration of dissent are better than pride and a sense of national mission; that liberty may be 
incompatible with, and better than, too much efficiency; that pluralism and untidiness are, to 
those who value freedom, better than the rigorous imposition of all-embracing systems, no 
matter how rational and disinterested, or than the rule of majorities against which there is no 
appeal. All this is deeply and uniquely English, and I freely admit that I am steeped in it, and 
believe in it, and cannot breathe freely save in a society where these values are for the most 
part taken for granted.11  
 
Berlin was a Russian-Jewish émigré and naturalised British citizen. As Michael Ignatieff suggests, his 
deep appreciation of English values and sensibilities may have stemmed from ‘an exile’s prerogative 
to love an adopted home with an absence of irony that is impossible for a native’.12 Whether this is the 
case or not, Berlin certainly identifies himself closely with his adopted home, claiming to be unable to 
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‘breathe freely’ in a society that does not resemble England. No less remarkable is the proximity of the 
ostensibly ‘English’ values and sensibilities to the ones he defends in his theoretical work. If liberty 
and pluralism are at the heart of Berlin’s work,13  he, according to his own expressly ‘biased’ 
understanding, considers those ideas ‘deeply and uniquely English’. 
What goods, more precisely, does Berlin repeatedly associate with ‘England’? Chief among 
them are: individual liberty conceptualised in negative terms as non-interference; tolerance towards 
others and their respective personal goals; peace and stability resulting from the fortune of England 
‘not [having been] invaded or seriously defeated for eight hundred years’;14 decency conceptualised 
primarily as the willingness to treat others humanely; and respect for privacy that allows men and 
women to do or to be (within limits) whatever they wish to do or to be. Those goods are tied to the 
liberal temperament of the English, who are: immune to fanaticism or extremism; moderate; untidy, 
though by no means chaotic or anarchical; benevolent and well-meaning, if at times patronizing; sober, 
empirical and commonsensical; and realistic, practical and piecemeal when tackling social and 
political problems. According to Berlin, England has been blessed with the historic fortune to 
organically connect the liberal goods and the liberal temperament to develop into a model liberal 
society. In his words: ‘liberalism is essentially the belief of people who have lived on the same soil for 
a long time in comparative peace with each other. An English invention’.15 Observe the use of the term 
‘soil’, which also appears in Berlin’s self-description. He says, for example, that he will never emigrate 
from England ‘because we are what we are and can only live on the soil that we do’. Similarly, he 
emphasises that ‘by nature I am rooted, not rootless and cosmopolitan’—rooted, that is, in Oxford, 
England, Great Britain.16 One may extend the organic metaphor and think of Berlin’s liberal England 
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in the image of a functional ecosystem: liberal goods are rooted in the fertile soil of liberal England, 
which is a natural habitat for liberals like Berlin himself. 
It must immediately be noted that some liberal values are missing or marginalised in Berlin’s 
liberal system. Consider progress and social welfare. Interpreted in evolutionary and organicist terms, 
these values were at the heart of the new liberalism of early 20th-century Britain, finding its most 
succinct expression in L. T. Hobhouse’s Liberalism.17 This brand of liberalism not only developed its 
Millian predecessor in a new historical context but also contributed significantly to the subsequent rise 
of the welfare state in Britain.18 Notwithstanding his express sympathy for ‘New Dealism’ and ‘the 
welfare state under Attlee’, however, Berlin gives little credit for the new liberal achievements; 
throughout his life, he was relatively unconcerned with socio-economic issues central to welfare 
thinking, including health, housing, employment and forms of industry. In fact, he hardly ever 
mentions key new liberal thinkers by name; on a rare occasion he did so, Berlin said he ‘was not 
deeply impressed [...] by Hobhouse’.19 Similarly, while individual autonomy is integral to another 
important, perfectionist strand of liberalism, it does not feature prominently in Berlin’s normative 
work. While he acknowledges the tradition of autonomy-based liberalism originating in Kant’s moral 
philosophy, he presents himself as belonging to an alternative, negative liberty-based tradition 
represented by the Mill of On Liberty. Unlike liberal perfectionists such as Joseph Raz and Steven 
Wall,20 Berlin does not consider it to be a legitimate part of the liberal state’s job to encourage its 
citizens to live autonomously or otherwise perfect themselves; he believes that the liberal state should 
be non-partisan, if not strictly neutral, regarding citizens’ personal decisions and their conceptions of 
the good. Thus, Berlin’s liberal England represents a particular kind of liberalism, which is neither 
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perfectionist nor reformist but distinctly minimalist. Its principal concern, as Jan-Werner Müller puts it, 
is ‘to avoid a summum malum, not the realization of any summum bonum’.21 To appropriate an image 
Arendt repeatedly evokes, Berlin’s England is an ‘island’ of negative liberty, surrounded by non-
liberal politics of various kinds from mild authoritarianism to Nazism and Stalinism.22 Berlin, like 
Arendt in this respect, considers the 20th century to be a dark time and indeed ‘the worst century there 
has ever been’, characterised by the rise of totalitarianism, total wars and mass killing on an 
unprecedented scale.23 On this menacing water floats Berlin’s England, whose liberal tradition is 
historically unique and yet has universal normative appeal. 
Two kinds of political menace appear prominently in Berlin’s commentary on ‘the worst 
century’. One is of a specifically Bolshevik kind, whereby a small group of ideologically motivated 
fanatics use extra-legal means, especially terror, to seize power and establish a highly illiberal regime. 
This is one of the chief threats Berlin has in mind when he repeatedly refers to Heinrich Heine’s 
‘power of ideas’ maxim: ‘philosophical concepts nurtured in the stillness of a professor’s study could 
destroy a civilisation’.24  Rousseau, Hegel, Marx and others came up with potentially explosive 
concepts, but it took Bolsheviks to actually and physically destroy a civilisation. A mirror image of 
Berlin’s fear is found in the words of Trotsky himself: ‘Nothing great has been accomplished in history 
without fanaticism’.25 To this type of threat Berlin’s England is conveniently and rather suspiciously 
insusceptible; if the English are by temperament averse to fanaticism, extremism and cruelty, England 
must be exempt from the risk of a Bolshevik-style revolution or insurrection. 
The second menace is of a distinctly right-wing kind, rooted in a specifically romantic 
nationalism. As is well known, Berlin does not regard nationalism as necessarily aggressive or 
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inherently illiberal.26 However, it can develop in these directions when: 1) it entails a political demand 
for collective self-determination; 2) the national community sets limits to the freedom of association 
and to the activities of other communities in civil society; 3) national values and allegiances are 
credited with moral supremacy over other group allegiances; and 4) the nation acquires a sense of 
mission that is considered so important that it justifies the removal of all impediments, by violent 
means if necessarily.27 Historically, Berlin argues, nations that have suffered from externally induced 
humiliation have been susceptible to this type of nationalism. Berlin’s celebrated ‘bent twig’ 
metaphor,28 as David Miller argues, is meant to illustrate this point: romantic nationalism is like a twig 
‘deformed by an unnatural outside force’ that ‘when released [...] strikes uncontrollably against the 
source of deformity’.29 The paradigmatic case of such ‘bent twig’ nationalism is, in Berlin’s view, 
Germany after the Napoleonic invasion, strongly resenting the universalist pretention of the French, 
while being acutely aware of its own cultural backwardness and political weakness.30 A fierce critic of 
the determinist conception of history, Berlin concedes that German romantic nationalism did not need 
to develop into the militaristic nationalism of Wilhelm II; nor did this need to morph into National 
Socialism. However, Berlin (unlike Arendt in this respect) does not consider 20th-century right-wing 
totalitarianism to be entirely unprecedented, marked by a fundamental break from its 19th-century, 
romantic nationalist precursor. The former could emerge out of the latter when combined with other 
ingredients such as irrationalism and the leadership cult under certain historical conditions. Again, 
Berlin’s England is ideally insusceptible to this type of menace. Although the rise and fall of the 
British Empire yielded English nationalism and indeed ‘English chauvinism’, this was not comparable 
to its malicious and aggressive German counterpart.31  Nor could it be if Berlin is right because, 
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according to his ‘bent twig’ hypothesis, externally induced humiliation is a prerequisite for the rise of 
romantic nationalism. If so, fascism will not emerge in England, unless the country is invaded or 
seriously defeated in the future. 
Berlin does not consider the value of benign English nationalism to consist solely in its 
inability to develop beyond a certain limit. It also consists in its capacity for satisfying what he sees as 
one of the most basic human needs deeply ingrained in our nature: the need to belong. At issue here is 
a specifically cultural belonging. In Berlin’s view, only in a group to which one has special cultural 
connections can one truly be at home and live a fulfilling life. He concedes that such a group does not 
need to be a nation; it could in theory be a voluntary association, a socio-economic class, and so on. In 
practice, however, the sense of national belonging underpinned by a common language and shared 
memory has proved stronger than other group allegiances. Berlin infers from this that the membership 
in a nation qua a cultural group is likely to continue to satisfy best the human need to belong, at least in 
the foreseeable future. 32  Observe that Berlin’s endorsement of nationality goes beyond Mill’s 
functionalist argument that a ‘feeling of common nationality’ has the merit of generating political 
stability and sustaining ‘free institutions’.33 While Berlin broadly shares the Millian view, he ultimately 
defends nationality in intrinsic, rather than instrumental, terms. He follows Herder’s conception of the 
nation as ‘purely and strictly a cultural attribute’ and considers the primary value of nationality to 
consist in its ability to provide a home for the collective life of a people.34 This explains why the 
diversity Berlin wishes to see in society concerns individuals and their opinions, preferences and 
dispositions and does not extend to sub-national cultural communities; the multiculturalist excess can 
undermine the special connections binding a people. Berlin claims that England is optimally diverse 
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and animated by the right kind and degree of nationalism. While it is ‘one of the least nationalist of all 
countries’, Englishmen and Englishwomen are bonded by sufficiently rich cultural and historical ties 
that they do not feel surrounded by strangers.35 
It is certainly true that Berlin reproduces some of the ‘most self-approving myths’ of England 
and its people.36 But he does more than that: he does his share in remoulding the myths. Of particular 
relevance here is the way he narrates the British philosophical tradition. In terms of a general outlook, 
he observes, British philosophy (like English society) has essentially been empiricist: sober, cool-
headed, commonsensical and anti-metaphysical. It began with Bacon and Hobbes, was developed by 
Locke, Berkeley and Hume, culminating in Bentham and Mill, and was succeeded in various ways by 
Berlin’s (near) contemporaries such as Russell, Moore, Ayer and Austin.37  Excluded from this 
narrative are, among others, British idealists such as Green, Bradley and Bosanquet. Berlin certainly 
knows some of the idealists’ work, not least because the Oxford of the late 1920s where he began his 
academic career was under their lingering influence.38 However, he like many of his contemporary 
empiricists often calls idealists ‘English Hegelians’ or ‘Hegelians in England’, underlining the 
foreignness of their ‘Germanic’ work to the presumably native British tradition. For example, in his 
most well-known book on liberty, Berlin admires Green as ‘exceptionally enlightened’ and 
‘genuine[ly] liberal’; yet he ultimately portrays Green as a follower of his German masters, prioritising 
positive liberty over the negative rival that has been defended by ‘classical English political 
philosophers’ and, of course, by Berlin himself.39 Berlin in this way joins the early 20th-century 
empiricists’ attempt to undo what was done in British philosophy between Mill and Russell. Even 
Berlin’s autobiographical recollections serve this purpose. Reading Bradley and Bosanquet as a 
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student, he recalls, was like ‘wandering in a very dark wood with broken light occasionally flickering 
through the branches’. Reading Moore’s Principia Ethica, by contrast, gave the young Berlin the 
feeling of being ‘transported’ to ‘an open, sunlit plain’.40 British empiricism thus gently shines over 
Berlin’s liberal England, to which idealists as well as fanatics, extremists and terrorists, and 
communists and fascists, do not belong. 
Berlin’s England, in short, is a half-realised liberal utopia. It is certainly not a Platonic 
blueprint utopia, portrayed in detail in the realm of purely theoretical reflection. Nor is it a Rawlsian 
realistic utopia that aims to show on the distant horizon ‘a long-term goal’ to move towards.41 Berlin’s 
utopia, rather, is what England at its best can be, embodying essential liberal values, an ideally liberal 
temperament, and a long intellectual tradition simultaneously defending negative liberty and defying 
politically suspicious metaphysical thinking from Kant, Hegel and Marx through Green, Bradley and 
Bosanquet on one side and Nietzsche and Heidegger on the other. Berlin’s England is also immune to 
the two worst manifestations of his fear: totalitarianism via a Bolshevik-style insurrection and 
totalitarianism via the hyperinflation of romantic nationalism. It is hardly surprising, then, that Berlin 
never seriously considered leaving England for either Israel (which he supported throughout his life) or 
America (where he thought his work could be better appreciated than in Britain). In fact, when Berlin 
was offered a full-time professorship by the City University of New York, he categorically said he did 
not have ‘the slightest intention of leaving England for any purposes whatsoever’. He wished to 




Arendt’s America  
What America meant to Arendt approximated to what England meant to Berlin. Like Berlin’s 
England, Arendt’s America is claimed to have been blessed with the ‘singular good fortune’ to realise 
ideals of universal human appeal.43 A set of historical conditions, such as the alleged absence of mass 
poverty and the indigenous tradition of local self-government, assisted the American endeavour to 
found a new free republic. As I shall elaborate, however, the gap Arendt saw between the ideal of 
America—what America at its best could be—and the reality—what America happened to be at a 
given moment in Arendt’s lifetime—was larger than the comparable gap Berlin saw in England. Her 
America was a somewhat schizophrenic entity, a half-realised utopia in recurring crisis; it was 
constantly pulled by various deleterious ‘social’ forces (in Arendt’s sense of the term) unleashed by 
modernity such as individualism, materialism and consumerism, while continually correcting itself by 
re-enacting what she called the ‘revolutionary spirit’. America, for her, was a quintessential modern 
free republic, with all the contradictions characterising modernity itself. Yet it was, in her words, ‘the 
only country where a republic at least still has a chance’.44 Arendt time and again mentioned this 
country to illustrate her conceptions of freedom, power and equality, as Berlin repeatedly referred to 
England to illustrate his conceptions of liberty, tolerance and decency. 
In Arendt’s terminology, the revolutionary ‘spirit’ contrasts with the ‘act’ of revolution. The 
latter ended when the Americans liberated themselves from British rule and established a new political 
order, but that which inspired the act of revolution in the first place—the underlying spirit—did not 
need to vanish with the end of the act. On the contrary, it had to survive if the newly founded body 
politic was to last as a free republic. What specifically constitutes the ‘spirit’? Chief among them are: 
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political freedom conceptualised as the exercise of the distinctly human capacity to act in the public 
realm and begin something new; the habit of forming voluntary associations to address matters of 
public concerns in a pragmatic and non-partisan fashion; the awareness of, and a propensity for, public 
happiness (as distinct from private welfare) arising out of the enjoyable experience of ‘discussions, [...] 
deliberations, and the making of decisions’ over public business;45 the ambition to excel accompanied 
by the desire to see the excellence of others working towards a shared political goal; and trust in the 
value of the plurality of opinions and the resulting opposition to the rule of unanimous public opinion. 
The revolutionary spirit so conceived is not a uniquely American spirit. It surfaced not only in 
revolutionary America but also in various moments of what Arendt referred to as ‘people’s utopia’, 
such as France in 1848 and 1870–71, Russia in 1905 and 1917, Germany in 1918–19, and Hungary in 
1956, characterised by the spontaneous emergence of self-governing councils.46 But the American 
Revolution was of special importance because, unlike the rest, it neither was externally suppressed nor 
descended into a reign of terror. On the contrary, it reified itself into the written Constitution, which 
thereafter served as the foundation of the new republic. 
As Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen observe, Arendt’s analysis of the American legal and 
political structure does not do justice to the complexity of competing constitutional principles that were 
present both at the moment of constitution-making and in subsequent US history; nor does Arendt’s 
narrative of the American Revolution do justice to the ‘competing interpretive perspectives’ that 
deserve serious consideration.47 Nevertheless, Arendt’s discussion is of theoretical interest for the 
same reason as Berlin’s commentary on England is of theoretical interest: it dramatizes particular 
aspects of the American experience to imaginatively reconstruct the free republic at its best. In fact, she 
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uses her narrative of America—what America once was—to internally criticise the actually existing 
America of her time; much of Arendt’s antidote to the ills of contemporary America consists in the 
reclaiming of what she takes to be older traditions of the republic.48 So understood, three features of 
Arendt’s commentary on US history and institutions are worth highlighting. First, she sees the written 
Constitution as codifying the revolutionary spirit. The Supreme Court is ‘a kind of Constitutional 
Assembly in continuous session’ because the judges, by interpreting or decoding the Constitution, 
reanimate the revolutionary spirit that gave birth to the constitutional order in the first place.49 Second, 
somewhat anachronistically reading Tocqueville into the history of revolutionary America, Arendt 
downgrades the populist current and underlines the anti-majoritarian current in both the written 
Constitution and the intentions of the Framers. She repeatedly highlights the Framers’ worries about 
‘elective despotism’, and presents both the Senate and the First Amendment as different institutional 
means of protecting dissenting minorities against the tyranny of the majority.50 Arendt’s America is a 
republic of competing opinions. Finally, and also in a Tocquevillian spirit, Arendt highlights the 
importance of a broader political culture supporting democratic institutions. Of particular note is her 
appraisal of citizens’ attachment to the Constitution; a written constitution is critically defective if it is 
not ‘understood, approved and beloved’ in the country it is supposed to govern.51 In short, the 
American legal and political structure institutionalises the revolutionary spirit and provides a basic 
framework where citizens have the opportunity to be ‘a participator in the government of affairs’.52 
Observe the difference between Arendt and Berlin on the underlying conditions that support 
the maintenance of their respective ideal polity. On the one hand, Berlin underlines the significance of 
informal institutions such as customs and conventions for the wellbeing of a liberal polity. More 
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specifically, liberal politics depends on a set of favourable sociological conditions, including the liberal 
temperament of the populace and the relative cultural homogeneity that binds people through a 
common language and shared memory. According to Arendt, on the other hand, a free republic 
depends not so much on ‘customs, manners, and traditions’ as on the more formal, and specifically 
‘legal systems that regulate our life in the world and our daily affairs with each other’.53 Of course, 
Arendt does not overestimate the power of the laws, as seen in her emphasis on the extra-legal culture 
of people’s attachment to the Constitution. However, ‘culture’ in this context refers to a Tocquevillian 
political culture, which differs from the Herderian national culture integral to Berlin’s liberal England. 
Contrary to Berlin, Arendt believes that a free republic does not need to be anchored in nationhood or 
relative cultural homogeneity. Rather, it ultimately relies on citizens’ mutual promises, including 
written promises in the form of declaration, covenant and so on, to actively and continuously 
participate in public affairs.54 
Like Berlin’s liberal England, Arendt’s American republic is claimed to have a built-in 
immune system defying the rise of totalitarianism. It is important to note, though, that the two thinkers 
have differing views on how totalitarianism paradigmatically emerges. Berlin’s fear, as I discussed 
earlier, chiefly concerns two scenarios: the violent seizure of power by a small group of Bolshevik-like 
fanatics, and the romantic outburst of nationalism in reaction to external humiliation. Neither scenario 
worries Arendt as much. Russell Jacoby is widely off the mark when he exaggerates the similarity 
between Arendt and Berlin (and Popper) and claims that ‘anti-Semitism and Nazism [...] do not figure 
into Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism’.55 On the contrary, she is emphatically concerned with what 
may be called a ‘Weimar nightmare’: the degeneration of liberal democracy into paralysis and then 
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into a power vacuum, which will be filled by a popularly supported totalitarian movement like 
Nazism. On her understanding, liberal democracy is inherently unstable and tends to feed its 
totalitarian enemies in two important ways. First, liberal democratic society increasingly releases men 
and women from traditional familial and social ties, thereby creating lonely, atomized and isolated 
individuals. Second, a totalitarian movement can appropriate liberal democratic institutions to recruit 
members and supporters from the lonely mass so created.56 Arendt’s chief worry concerns not so 
much fanaticism as populism enhanced by modern mass society. Its mirror image is found in Hitler 
and Goebbels’s May 1932 praise of elections: ‘Voting, voting! Out to the people. We’re all very 
happy’.57 
Nevertheless, Arendt does not believe that liberal democracies must of necessity repeat 
Weimar’s failure. Their demise is averted so long as the deleterious forces of mass society are 
overridden. Arendt’s revolutionary spirit plays precisely this role. Turning men and women into active 
citizens instead of lonely individuals, it keeps the ‘potentiality and [the] ever-present danger’ of a 
totalitarian takeover in America as it is: an unrealised potentiality.58 This aspect of Arendt’s thought 
may be called a ‘republicanism of fear’, which subverts the Berlinian primacy of negative liberty over 
the positive counterpart.59 In her view, liberal democracy and the protection of negative liberty it 
provides can collapse à la Weimar, unless citizens show the willingness to exercise the political 
freedom to act and care for the human-made world they inhabit. Negative liberty is in this sense 
dependent on political freedom, as much as the latter is dependent on the former. Interwar Germans 
enjoyed a considerable degree of negative liberty and yet exercised little—too little—political 
freedom. Arendt insists that post-war Americans ought to act differently. 
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Arendt is not sure, however, if post-war Americans do as a matter of fact act differently from 
interwar Germans. In a series of essays published in the late 1960s and early 1970s,60 she diagnoses 
her adopted country with various political ills, which may be grouped under the familiar 
individual/civil society/state headings. On the first level, US citizens increasingly yielded to the 
inclinations to: delegate political freedom to elected representatives; embrace the (negative) freedom 
from politics and retreat to the comfort of privacy and the household; seek happiness in the economic 
sphere of consumption and production; and appropriate political institutions to pursue private interests 
rather than shared political goals (‘[c]orruption and perversion [...] from below’).61 On the level of civil 
society, voluntary associations had morphed into self-sustaining pressure groups, while extensively 
bureaucratised political parties served their own special interests. And on the level of the state, the 
political class consisting of career politicians and their aides withdrew into the political capital; Public 
Relations methods infiltrated the sphere of governance to ‘sell’ policies and ‘buy’ votes; and purported 
specialists equipped with social science techniques were given offices to tackle political problems as 
though these had been managerial problems. In short, Arendt sees ‘the social’ increasingly eclipsing all 
spheres of political life in America. Nonetheless, she does not claim that the country’s revolutionary 
spirit has been irreparably lost; it has merely gone missing, albeit for a long time. She concedes that the 
republic has been chronically ill, but she insists that it needs and deserves citizens’ loving care. 
Finally, America’s attraction to Arendt also consists in the republic’s ability to inspire men and 
women to live a fulfilling life, as she conceptualises this. Ambiguities and hesitations notwithstanding, 
as I discussed elsewhere, she tends to defend the political way of life monistically as superior to the 
other ways.62 In her view, one can neither realise his or her potentiality in full nor experience the 
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happiness of living with and among others, unless he or she exercises the distinctly human capacity to 
speak and act in the public realm. A human life lived with no political participation is, in Arendt’s 
words, ‘literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among 
men’.63 Of course, she never supports the idea of forcing men and women into a particular way of life, 
no matter how good that way might be. Nor is she so naive as to expect everyone to show the courage 
to appear in public. But she wants free republics to ‘assure [the politically active] of their rightful place 
in the public realm’ to allow and encourage them to flourish, and she believes that such reassurance 
has by and large been provided in America.64 This makes America especially appealing to Arendt. 
Berlin profoundly disagrees. A pioneering advocate of what has come to be known as value 
pluralism, he categorically and unambiguously rejects the very idea that a single way of life can claim 
normative superiority over others (so much so that he, unlike Arendt, has repeatedly been accused of 
unintended commitment to relativism). 65  Human values are irreducibly many, and different 
combinations of different values give rise to multiple, and equally valid, ways of living. This type of 
pluralism is in Berlin’s view a fundamental fact of human life, and liberal England is a good and 
humane society because it is doubly attuned to that fact: it protects men and women’s negative liberty 
to allow them to live as they wish; and it strikes the right balance between suffocating moralism and 
excessive diversity, such that men and women neither feel compelled to conform to a prevailing social 
norm nor are rootless in the society in which they find themselves. It is small wonder, then, why Berlin 
says Arendt’s political ideals are ‘not for me’.66  
Despite their shared anti-totalitarian commitment, the two thinkers are thus divided by their 
conflicting conceptions of the good life, by their differing views of the proper role of politics in human 
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life, by their contrasting understandings of the ways in which the totalitarian threat presents itself, and 
by their competing ideas for the appropriate social and political structure enabling men and women to 
live a fulfilling life. Pace Russell Jacoby and his followers, it is a mistake to group the two thinkers 
together as ‘liberal anti-utopians’.67 
 
1968: A Utopian Moment? 
The differences between Berlin’s and Arendt’s visions may by illustrated further by focusing on one 
particular point in time at which the two thinkers’ paths intersected: New York City, 1968. Arendt, as 
is well known, lived in the Upper West Side and paid close attention to the unrest in the city. Less 
famous is the fact that Berlin then held a part-time visiting Professorship at the City University of New 
York and spent nearly one year in total between 1966 and 1971. But the parallel ran further. Berlin was 
offered an honorary doctorate by Columbia University and was scheduled to attend the 
Commencement on 4 June 1968. In the meantime, Columbia students’ protests escalated during the 
spring semester, and the university authority decided to bring the police in on campus on 30 April, 
resulting in 712 arrests and 148 reported injuries.68 Arendt was so curious as to visit the campus to see 
the upheaval by herself. Berlin paid no less close attention from afar, wondering if the Commencement 
would take place as it had been planned. The two thinkers’ papers from this period display fascinating 
points of comparison. Simply put, Arendt saw 1968 in terms of a reiteration of previous utopian 
moments in modernity; Berlin could not disagree more. 
Consider Berlin first. In the late 1960s, he unsurprisingly spoke of the contrast between 
exhilarating and yet frightening New York/America and peaceful if somewhat dull Oxford/England.69 
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He noted a worry in passing in May 1968: ‘New York—the student riots—the slowly mounting mass 
of black anger—is terrifying’.70 But he was not terrified enough to cancel his plan to attend the 
Columbia Commencement. He kept his head by portraying the situation in his characteristically 
humorous tone. A few days before the Commencement, he wrote to his friend McGeorge Bundy, 
former security advisor to both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson:  
 
I propose to come [to Columbia] armed with a water-pistol, and if any militant student 
approaches me I shall rise up against him and say that the dons have turned, the worms fight 
back, and douse him. La Grande Peur, which is supposed to have seized everybody in 1791, or 
whenever it was, seems to be nothing compared to the terror of all professors before the 
slightest sign of student dissatisfaction. Why cannot the professors build barricades of their 
own?71 
 
Berlin’s tone is playful, but it is clear to which side he considered himself to belong: the university 
authority. He saw hundreds of 68-ers whom he called ‘Christs’ filling the streets of New York with a 
mixture of curiosity, bewilderment, alarm and contempt. He regarded them as politically and 
intellectually worthless: they were ‘all wild, all bearded, all very mad’.72 In a less playful letter, Berlin 
in fact denounced them as barbaric, crude, nihilistic, confused, and ‘complacently ignorant’.73 This 
verdict was not solely due to Berlin’s taste for high culture. The 68-ers, even by their own account, 
were highly critical of the traditional liberal values and sensibilities Berlin cherished. To focus on the 
American ones, the 68-ers wanted their fellow citizens, especially the older generation, to be less 
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content with their government and to care more about the injustices it committed both at home and 
abroad. To be apolitical, in their view, was to endorse the status quo, amounting to complicity in the 
oppression of the black population and the misadventure in Vietnam, among other things. Berlin 
disagreed. He considered the 68-ers’ claims too naive, arguing that even Vietnam could not be 
understood in such unequivocal terms.74 Nor was he impressed by their demand for greater democratic 
engagement, which was in his view moralistically curbing the sphere of privacy that men and women 
were entitled to enjoy. He was aware of his critics’ perception of him as ‘a kind of leader of a suicide 
squad of blind liberal reactionaries’ and yet stood by his principles.75 ‘I long for some bourgeois 
stability’, he wrote, ‘some protection against the turning of all private, inner, disinterested activity into 
screams and shouts and public issues’.76 The 68-ers’ primary vice, in Berlin’s view, was the tendency 
to politicise everything—to be a political animal. New York City filled with those animals was 
antithetical to Berlin’s stable, orderly and tolerant liberal England. It reminded him of ‘Rome in the 
very last years’.77 
Arendt’s response to the upheaval could scarcely be more different. She noted the volatility of 
‘the country and the universities in particular’ as early as November 1967, but from the outset she 
expressed clear sympathy for rebellious youth.78 She shared with them the basic sense that America 
was in moral as well as social and political crisis. Like them, she saw apathy and hypocrisy in the 
‘bourgeois stability’, for which liberals like Berlin longed. Five months before the Columbia incident, 
she predicted that as long as the police were kept out of campus, ‘things don’t get out of hand, and the 
direction student opinion takes hardly ever drifts toward extremes’.79 She remained firmly on the 
student side after witnessing the Columbia incident, criticising the university authority as ‘particularly 
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dreadful’.80 To her eyes, rebellious youth were not ‘wild, bearded and mad Christs’ or roaming 
ignorant barbarians. They were courageous citizens and carriers of the revolutionary spirit, fuelled by a 
sense of justice and undeterred by police brutality. Of course, she did not uncritically admire the 68-
ers. She made differing judgments on their diverse practices, depending on their individual merits. Nor 
was she impressed by what she called the 68-ers’ ‘curious timidity in theoretical matters’.81 In fact, she 
criticised their inclination to rely on clichéd slogans, often failing to ‘recogniz[e] realities as such’.82 
Nevertheless, Arendt’s overall view of the 68-ers was strikingly optimistic. The distinctive feature of 
this generation, she said, was ‘its determination to act, its joy in action, the assurance of being able to 
change things by one’s own efforts’.83 The upheavals in New York, Chicago, Berkeley and elsewhere 
of her time were akin to other moments of ‘people’s utopia’ from Philadelphia 1776 to Budapest 
1956.84 She wrote to Karl Jaspers: 
 
It seems to me that children in the next century will learn about the year 1968 the way we 
learned about the year 1848. […] Things are in an extremely dangerous state here [in the 
United States], too; but I sometimes think this is the only country where a republic at least still 
has a chance. And besides that, one has the feeling that one is among friends.85 
 
The final sentence deserves special attention because it indicates a sense of belonging, which 
is somewhat surprising, considering Arendt’s life-story. As is well known, she spent her entire 
formative years in Germany and arrived in the United States in 1941 as a refugee and a 36-year-old 
woman. She did not and could not become socially and culturally American as Berlin, who migrated 
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to England as an 11-year-old boy, became English. Five years after her arrival in New York, Arendt 
composed in her native language arguably the saddest poem she ever wrote: ‘Wohl dem, der keine 
Heimat hat; er sieht sie noch im Traum’. [‘Happy is he who has no home; he still sees it in his 
dreams’.]86 True, her legal homelessness ended on 10 December 1951, when she was granted US 
citizenship that gave her a ‘right to have rights’, that is, ‘the right of every human being to membership 
in a political community’.87 But she never rid herself of a sense of loss, seeing herself as a ‘German 
Jew driven from [her] homeland by the Nazis’.88 Nevertheless, eventually, she in a way came to feel at 
home in America. That was not only because she cultivated a circle of close friends in her adopted 
country, but also because she found herself among fellow citizens who shared with her the willingness 
to act and work to preserve and improve the free republic that they had together inherited. Her true 
homeland may have remained to be the German language, but her political home was now America.89 
It is hard to avoid psychoanalytic imagery here: she found in the 1960s American republic a cure to the 
trauma that the Weimar Republic had inflicted on her in the 1930s.90 Tellingly, ‘public happiness’ was 
the term Arendt often used to describe the sense one has when experiencing political freedom. Happy 
did she become, then, finding a home in America; she saw it in front of her.  
Over this issue of belonging, and over its place in an ideal polity, however, Arendt and Berlin 
fundamentally disagreed. In Arendt’s view, crises and disasters of the early 20th century laid bare the 
elementary truth that the principle of national self-determination would always be incompatible with 
the demographic complexity of Europe and other regions, and what remained of the nation-state 
system after 1945 would be living on borrowed time. We thus find in Arendt’s work not so much the 
now clichéd effort to ‘dispel the myth of the nation-state’ as a series of attempts to articulate a new 
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form of government and a new international order, based on the assumption that the end of the nation-
state was essentially a fait accompli. Berlin, by contrast, sought to rehabilitate the nation-state system 
by conceptualising a specifically cultural nationalism compatible with liberal principles. In his view, 
nationalism should be given ‘channels of productive self-expression’, for the need to belong is a very 
basic human need, and national belonging has historically proved to be the only group allegiance that 
is rich enough to give its members ‘indissoluble and impalpable ties of common language, historical 
memory, habit, tradition and feeling’ to satisfy that need.91 Separated from those ‘ties’, the right to 
political participation alone is insufficient to let one feel at home in the community to which he or she 
belongs. 
According to this Berlinian account, one cannot coherently say, as Arendt did, that one’s 
‘loyalty is with the republic, not the country, but more concretely [...] with the people’ because, in 
Berlin’s view, to be loyal to the people is to be loyal to the country.92 Likewise, if we agree with 
Berlin, we will be required to conclude that the happiness Arendt apparently experienced in America 
must have been an incomplete happiness, and the ‘home’ she believed to have found there must have 
been no more than a shelter, for true home requires roots, and the natural soil for the human roots is not 
a republic but a country, not politics but culture. Arendt, on her part, saw no incoherence in her loyalty. 
She rebutted the relevance of cultural homogeneity to the vitality of a free republic, insisted on the 
sufficiency of the power of promise-making for political order and stability, and dismissed the desire to 
‘return’ to a world imagined as a family of homogeneous nations as unfeasible at best and delusional at 
worst.93 One may of course dispute her arguments, but those who know her life-story are likely to see a 
certain unity of theory and practice in her own life. After 18 years of being a stateless person between 
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1933 and 1951, she settled in America, learned ‘to truly love the world’ there, and lived happily—
politically speaking—as a US citizen until the end of her life.94  
 
Conclusion 
Many commentators have criticised and even ridiculed Berlin’s tendency to idealise English society, 
often linking this to the émigré intellectual’s desire to be admired and accepted, preferably by those in 
the ‘Establishment’. No less has been written on Arendt’s comparable, if less consistent, inclination to 
exaggerate the revolutionary tradition in America and her apparent inability to understand some of the 
country’s deepest problems, including racism. Her shortfalls too have been explained in psychological 
terms as stemming from her being ‘protective of her new country and homeland’.95 While there is 
something to be said for these critical observations, one wonders if some of the harsher comments live 
up to the principle of interpretive charity.96 Considering Berlin’s express acknowledgement of his ‘pro-
British bias’ and Arendt’s deep ambivalence towards America, this essay has suggested a different, 
more charitable, and hopefully more nuanced reading, connecting the two thinkers’ parallel 
idealisations to their shared opposition to radical utopianism. True, as Russell Jacoby emphasises, both 
Berlin and Arendt considered the ills of radical utopianism to consist partly in its record of generating 
undesirable political consequences. However, they also considered the ills to consist in radical 
utopianism’s audacity to theorise normative ideals prior to ‘applying’ them to the real world, resulting 
in a consistent failure to do justice to the inherent ‘untidiness’ (Berlin) or the ‘melancholy 
haphazardness’ of the human world (Arendt).97 They could not possibly find the Rawlsian strategy to 
hedge undesirable excesses of radical utopianism appealing; it keeps its radical cousin’s audacity 
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essentially intact, even if it does not breed a Stalin. But, instead of turning straightforwardly anti-
utopian, Berlin and Arendt alike developed a different mode of thinking to depict utopian visions out 
of imaginative reconstruction of existing polities. Berlin extracted key ingredients constituting his ideal 
polity from select aspects of English history, as Arendt extracted her corresponding ingredients from 
select aspects of American history. Both thinkers have duly attracted the charges of over-generalisation 
and factual inaccuracies, but that was the price they had to pay to develop this mode of utopian 
thinking. 
Why, finally, should such reality-sensitive mode of thinking be called ‘utopian’? Should the 
label not be reserved for something more idealistic? The first thing to note in reply is that both Berlin’s 
England and Arendt’s America are, as I have shown, reconstructed visions and in this sense non-
places. Besides, both display a very high degree of idealism; in this context, the proximity of those 
visions to that of the great utopian thinker Ernst Bloch may be worth highlighting. According to Bloch, 
men and women in utopia will ‘no longer [...] be humiliated, enslaved, forsaken, scorned, estranged, 
annihilated, and deprived of identity’.98 Observe how each and every item on Bloch’s list is present, 
albeit in differing ways, in both Berlin’s England and Arendt’s America. Men and women in the 
former are not humiliated, enslaved, annihilated, forsaken or scorned not only because their basic 
rights and liberties are protected but also because they live in a peaceful, stable, tolerant, decent and 
humane society. Moreover, they are no longer estranged or deprived of identity partly because they 
live as they freely (in the negative sense of the term) choose but also because they live in a cultural 
home where they feel they truly belong. Arendt’s America meets Bloch’s utopian demands differently 
but no less robustly. Men and women there do not suffer from enslavement or annihilation because, in 
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addition to enjoying the legal and institutional protection of basic rights, they continuously and 
vigorously exercise the right to free speech and assembly to resist, as a people, detrimental social 
forces inherent in modernity. As individuals, they may still face attempts to humiliate, scorn or forsake, 
but members of Arendt’s ideal polity would be able to fight back against such attempts. Furthermore, 
they exercise their political freedom to act in public to realise their full potentiality and enjoy living 
with and among their peers. In so doing, they disclose themselves, acquire their true identities and thus 
free themselves from possible estrangement from themselves; and they make unique contributions to 
the world they share with others and free themselves from the risk of world alienation. Contrary to 
Jacoby’s and his followers’ oversimplification, Berlin’s and Arendt’s visions in this way differ from 
each other in important respects. Nevertheless, the two thinkers are united by at least one thing: the 
willingness to imagine in dark times a non-place where men and women are not only safe from the 
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